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SCOOTING UNDER THE INFLUENCE: CRIMINAL
LIABILITY IN THE AGE OF MICRO-TRANSIT
Jacques Chouinard*

Over the past two years, dockless electric scooters have become a
staple of modern urban transit. Dockless electric scooters and
other micro-transit devices present a unique challenge in the
realm of criminal liability. Considering that electric scooters are
lightweight, low-speed devices with an ambiguous regulatory
status, how will driving under the influence statutes be enforced
when scooter riders inevitably “scoot” while intoxicated? This
question requires rapid and innovative answers; scooter riders in
a number of jurisdictions have already been charged under
existing driving under the influence statutes with varying levels of
success.
This comment seeks to provide those answers by examining the
current and historical state of driving under the influence laws as
applied to non-automobile transportation devices. Concluding
that the current body of law in this area is ambiguous, inequitable,
and antiquated, the comment then proposes a two-part answer to
the question of intoxicated scooter riders’ criminal liability. The
legislature should first create a statutory definition that affords
legal status to micro-transit devices, including electric scooters.
Then, the legislature should create a new statutory crime
addressing this issue. The statute should provide proportional
criminal penalties that serve as more effective deterrents. This
approach is preferable to a judicial remedy, as the slow pace of
the judiciary cannot match the rapid growth of the micro-transit
industry. Finally, the Appendix to this comment provides model
statutes that legislators can use as a guide in drafting new and
effective rules concerning criminal liability in the micro-transit
context.
INTRODUCTION
Are intoxicated electric scooter operators guilty of driving under the
influence? Not long ago, the answer to this question would have been a legal
curiosity. However, dockless electric scooters have since become ubiquitous in urban
centers across the United States.1 A dockless electric scooter is a two wheeled,
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electrically powered device with handlebars and a floorboard designed to be ridden
from a standing position.2 The rapid and loosely regulated distribution of electric
scooters by ridesharing companies, in addition to the commercial availability of
electric scooters, has led to charges for driving under the influence in multiple
jurisdictions.3 Currently, New Mexico law is silent with regards to the regulatory
status of dockless electric scooters and other micro-transit devices.
Part I of this comment examines how New Mexico law approaches nonautomobile vehicles in the context of DUI with an emphasis on statutory and judicial
inconsistency. The leading authority addressing the definition of the term “vehicle”
as used in the state’s driving under the influence (“DUI”) statute is State v. Saiz.4
There, a defendant was convicted under the state’s driving under the influence statute
after drunkenly operating a moped.5 On appeal, the court held that any vehicle was
subject to the broad language of New Mexico’s DUI statute6–including mopeds–and
affirmed the conviction.7 The court broadly construed the term “vehicle” as defined
by the Motor Vehicle Code to include any non-human powered device used to move
a person along a road.8
Part I also discusses how, in the intervening period, the New Mexico
legislature enacted a statutory carve out for a type of alternative transportation device
referred to as an electric personal assistive mobility device (“EPAMD”). EPAMDs
share some similarities with modern electric scooters, but the statutory definition of
EPAMD applies clearly to only one device: the Segway Personal Transporter. The
statutory carve out exempted EPAMDs from the provisions of the Motor Vehicle
Code and afforded EPAMD operators the same rights and responsibilities as
pedestrians.9 This carve out created ambiguity between judicial and legislative
approaches to non-automobile devices in the DUI context.
P.A. whose advocacy and persistence inspired this Comment. Finally, I would like to thank my family for
their endless patience and support.
1.See Samantha Raphelson, Dockless Scooters Gain Popularity and Scorn Across the U.S., NATIONAL
PUBLIC RADIO, (Aug. 29, 2018, 4:29 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/29/643058414/docklessscooters-gain-popularity-and-scorn-across-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/JE78-8MQD].
2. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 407.5 (West 2008) (This statute defines a “motorized scooter,” which is
the functional equivalent of “dockless electric scooter” for the purposes of this comment).
3. See, e.g., Matthew Reisen, Woman Riding on Electric Scooter Charged with DWI,
ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL (May 30, 2019, 11:39 PM), https://www.abqjournal.com/1322102/woman-onelectric-scooter-charged-with-dwi.html [https://perma.cc/W4XZ-24K3];
Man Charged with DUI on Electric Scooter in Tempe, KTAR.COM (Feb. 5, 2019, 3:09 PM),
https://ktar.com/story/2424957/man-charged-with-dui-on-electric-scooter-in-tempe
[https://perma.cc/BZ9Q-8JLZ]; Police: Man Arrested After Riding E-Scooter Drunk Down 16th Street
Mall, CBS4 DENVER (Oct. 2, 2018, 3:00 PM) https://denver.cbslocal.com/2018/10/02/man-arrestedscooter-drunk-16th-street [https://perma.cc/SDF4-2Q9J]; Laura J. Nelson, Another First for Scooters in
L.A.: A Conviction for Scooting Under the Influence, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Sep. 26 2018, 4:25 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-scooter-dui-20180926-story.html
[https://perma.cc/R87Z-DS9U].
4. 2001-NMCA-035, 103 N.M. 333, 24 P.3d 365.
5. Id. at ¶ 1, 24 P.3d at 365.
6. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102 (2016).
7. Saiz, 2001-NMCA-035, ¶¶ 8–9, 24 P.3d at 367.
8. Id. ¶ 3, 24 P.3d at 366 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-419(B) (1990)).
9. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-3-1102 (C), (D) (2007).
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New Mexico is not alone in grappling with how alternative transportation
devices fit into existing statutory frameworks. Courts in Idaho,10 Kentucky,11
Michigan,12 Minnesota,13 and North Carolina14 have applied, or declined to apply,
DUI statutes to non-automobile devices. Part II discusses those decisions to illustrate
the difficulty facing state judiciaries in defining new types of transportation devices.
Part III analyzes the implications of applying current DUI penalties to
electric scooters. In particular, this section will demonstrate that current DUI
penalties are neither sufficiently deterrent nor proportionate when applied to
intoxicated scooter operators.
Part IV details the need for a new solution to the problem of operating
scooters under the influence. Part IV then proposes a statutory definition for microtransit devices that covers electric scooters and similar lightweight, low-speed
devices. Further, Part IV contemplates the new crime of operating a micro-transit
device under the influence of alcohol or drugs and provides a framework for
developing proportional, deterrent penalties. Part IV also addresses the feasibility of
creating new statutory frameworks for dockless electric scooters and briefly details
current legislative efforts in this arena.
Finally, Part V illustrates why a legislative remedy is the preferable solution
to this problem by showing that courts are ill-equipped to develop a body of law
governing new transportation devices.
BACKGROUND
I.

New Mexico’s Approach to Driving Under the Influence.
A.

Current Statutory Provisions.

Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (“DUI”) is a statutory crime
in all fifty United States.15 New Mexico’s Motor Vehicle Code16 defines the offense
as the unlawful operation of a vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol.17 The
term “vehicle” is also statutorily defined:
[A vehicle is] every device in, upon or by which any person or
property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway,
including any frame, chassis, body or unitized frame and body of
any vehicle or motor vehicle, except devices moved exclusively

10. See State v. McKie, 417 P.3d 1001 (Idaho Ct. App. 2018); State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965 (Idaho
Ct. App. 2014).
11. See Adams v. Commonwealth, 275 S.W.3d 209, 210 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).
12. See People v. Lyon, 872 N.W.2d 245 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
13. See State v. Greenman, 825 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013); State v. Brown, 801 N.W.2d
186 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
14. See State v. Crow, 623 S.E.2d 68 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
15. See HEINONLINE, 50 STATE SURVEYS: DRUNK DRIVING (8th ed. 2019), https://heinonlineorg.unmlawlibrary.idm.oclc.org/HOL/NSSL?collection=nssl&law=DRUNK%20DRIVING&edition=8
(last visited Mar. 29, 2020).
16. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-1-1 to -13-13 (2019).
17. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-8-102(A), (B) (2016).
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by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or
tracks.18
These statutes seem straightforward under facial scrutiny. However,
whether a device constitutes a vehicle for the purposes of Section 66-8-102 has not
always been clear. New Mexico courts have had to determine which devices actually
fit the definition of a vehicle in the DUI context.
B.

State v. Saiz and the New Mexico Motor Vehicle Code.

In 2001, the New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed Nestor Saiz’s DUI
conviction under Section 66-8-102.19 At the time of his arrest, Saiz was operating a
moped.20 On appeal, Saiz argued that a moped, as defined by the New Mexico Motor
Vehicle Code, was not a vehicle and was exempt from the provisions of Section 668-102.21
Saiz was a matter of first impression in New Mexico and required the court
to interpret the statutory definitions of the terms “moped” and “vehicle” in relation
to the state’s DUI statute.22 Since Section 66-8-102 forbids New Mexicans from
driving any vehicle while intoxicated, the court first had to determine whether or not
a moped was a vehicle under the statute.23 The New Mexico Motor Vehicle Code
defined a moped as a “two-wheeled or three-wheeled vehicle with an automatic
transmission and a motor having a piston displacement of less than fifty cubic
centimeters, that is capable of propelling the vehicle at a maximum speed of not more
than thirty miles per hour on level ground. . . . “24 The court held that this definition
was consistent with the statutory definitions of vehicles and motor vehicles.25
Further, the court reasoned that the definition of vehicle was broader than that of
motor vehicle; motor vehicles are essentially a subset of the broader category of
vehicles.26 For the purposes of the Motor Vehicle Code, Saiz’s moped was a vehicle
because it was a device that transported a person along a highway and was not moved
exclusively by human power.
The remainder of the court’s analysis flowed from this foundation. The
court construed Section 66-8-102 in concert with the definitional statutes for mopeds
and vehicles: Section 66-8-102 applies to operators of any type of vehicle; a moped
is a vehicle when the statutory definitions of those terms are read together; therefore,
an operator of a moped is subject to Section 66-8-102’s prohibition of driving under
the influence.

18. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-4.19(B) (2017).
19. See 2001-NMCA-035, ¶ 1, 130 N.M. 333, 24 P.3d 365.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. ¶¶ 2, 4, 24 P.3d at 366.
23. Id. ¶¶ 2–4, 24 P.3d at 366.
24. Id. ¶ 3, 24 P.3d at 366 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-4.11(F) (1998)).
25. Id. (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-4.19(B) (2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-4.11(I) (1998)
(defining motor vehicles as “every vehicle that is self-propelled and every vehicle that is propelled by
electric power obtained from batteries or from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon rails”)).
26. Id.
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Saiz also argued that the regulatory statute governing mopeds exempted
moped operators from Section 66-8-102’s criminal penalties.27 The regulatory statute
stated, in pertinent part, “Except as provided in Subsections A and B of this section,
none of the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code relating to motor vehicles or
motorcycles . . . shall apply to a moped.”28 Saiz argued that this exemption precluded
his conviction, but the court disagreed. Construing the statutory definitions of
vehicle, motor vehicle, and moped in concert with the moped regulatory provision,
the court reasoned that Section 66-3-1101 only exempted mopeds from the
provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code that regulated motor vehicles.29 Unfortunately
for Saiz, Section 66-8-102 applied to all vehicles, not just those that fit the definition
of motor vehicle.30 Drawing on its prior reasoning, the court held that mopeds were
within the larger set of vehicles and affirmed Saiz’s conviction.
State v. Saiz illustrates the classic method of statutory construction
employed by New Mexico appellate courts. The court drew on the plain language of
the statutory framework and construed the statutes so that they remained harmonious
and logically consistent.31 Further, the court ensured that its interpretation remained
consistent with the policy aims of Section 66-8-102.
C.

The Motor Vehicle Code’s Policy Aims.

The Motor Vehicle Code’s policy aims were well articulated by the court
in State v. Richardson, another case that analyzed the applicability of Section 66-8102 to alternative means of transportation.32 On August 27, 1990, James Richardson
made the unfortunate decision to drink ten beers, get in a large tractor with a mower
attachment, and attempt to mow weeds along an unpaved road in Chaves County,
New Mexico.33 After demolishing a fence and uprooting a mailbox, Richardson was
arrested, charged with DUI under Section 66-8-102(A), and convicted.34 Utilizing
the same method of statutory construction employed in Saiz, the Court of Appeals
held that a tractor fit the definition of a motor vehicle, subjecting tractor drivers to
the provisions of Section 66-8-102.35 The court reasoned that statutory construction
must give effect to the statute’s underlying public policy.36 According to the court,
the underlying policy goal of Section 66-8-102 “is to prevent individuals who, either
mentally or physically, or both, are unable to exercise the clear judgment and steady
hand necessary to handle a vehicle with safety both to the individual and the
public.”37 Exempting tractors from Section 66-8-102 would be contrary to the
statute’s policy goals. Allowing tractor drivers to drive while intoxicated would

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. ¶ 6, 24 P.3d at 366.
Id., 24 P.3d at 367 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-3-1101 (1981)).
Id. ¶ 7, 24 P.3d at 367.
Id.
Id.
1992-NMCA-041, 113 N.M. 740, 832 P.2d 801.
Id. ¶ 2, 832 P.2d at 801.
Id.
See id. ¶¶ 6–11, 832 P.2d at 802¬04.
Id. ¶ 8, 832 P.2d at 803.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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create clear dangers to the public, and those dangers were much the same as those
created by drunk drivers of other large motor vehicles.38
New Mexico courts have also given effect to the policy goals of Section 668-102 by interpreting driving under the influence as a strict liability crime. Strict
liability crimes require a clear legislative intent that no mens rea is necessary for the
crime.39 Strict liability crimes demonstrate that the legislature found an overly
compelling public interest in prohibiting a particular course of conduct, regardless of
material intent. In State v. Harrison, the court explicitly articulated the compelling
public interest served by Section 66-8-102: “Obviously, the public’s interest in
deterring individuals from driving while intoxicated is compelling. This is due to the
dangers of the practice, not only to those who operate motor vehicles while under
the influence, but also to those innocent individuals who are killed as a result of DWI
accidents.”40 The court further reasoned that the risk from driving under the influence
is amplified because such conduct is not only harmful to drunk drivers themselves,
but to the public generally.41
New Mexico courts have consistently held that the policy goals of Section
66-8-102 are to protect the public and individuals from the dangers of drunk
driving.42 This interpretation is evidenced by the broad construal of statutory
definitions that bring non-automobile vehicles under the auspices of Section 66-8102. Further, courts have given effect to the legislature’s intent in prohibiting driving
under the influence by interpreting the offense as a strict liability crime.
D.

Section 66-3-1102 and the Emergence of EPAMDs.

New Mexico courts had ostensibly settled how Section 66-8-102 applies to
non-automobile transportation devices. Shortly after State v. Saiz was decided,
however, the New Mexico state legislature created a new statute defining “electric
personal assistive mobility devices.” That statute raises questions about courts’
interpretation of the terms “vehicle.”43 For nearly twenty years, this inconsistency
has not been an issue. Yet the emergence of dockless electric scooters has created a
renewed need for reconciliation here. Electric scooters resemble EPAMDs but are
distinct, and neither device is clearly contained within the statutory definition of
“vehicle.”
Understanding the origins of this inconsistency requires a trip back to the
year 2001. Dean Kamen, a brilliant and somewhat eccentric inventor, debuted the
Segway Personal Transporter (PT) on Good Morning America.44 The Segway was a
“technological marvel”; it was ridden from a standing position and utilized advanced
gyroscopic and computer technology to allow riders to control the device simply by
38. Id.
39. State v. Harrison, 1992-NMCA-139, ¶ 18, 115 N.M. 73, 846 P.2d 1082, 1086 (defining strict
liability in the context of driving under the influence).
40. Id. ¶ 19, 846 P.2d at 1086.
41. Id.
42. See id.; see also State v. Saiz, 2001-NMCA-035, ¶ 1, 130 N.M. 333, 24 P.3d 365..
43. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-3-1102 (2007).
44. Jordan Golson, Well, That Didn’t Work: The Segway is a Technological Marvel. Too Bad It
Doesn’t Make Any Sense, WIRED (10:00 AM, Jan. 6, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/01/well-didntwork-segway-technological-marvel-bad-doesnt-make-sense [https://perma.cc/P4DH-52NK].
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shifting their body weight forward and back.45 The Segway PT was hailed as
revolutionary and was expected to completely reshape modern urban transit.46
Segway lobbyists spread out across the country, working to convince state and
federal legislators to create a regulatory environment that would allow Segways onto
sidewalks, bike paths, and roads.47 These lobbying efforts worked; state legislatures
across the country created new statutory frameworks that defined and regulated a
new device called an “electric personal assistive mobility device.”48 The statutory
definition of EPAMDs was essentially uniform: an EPAMD was a “self-balancing
device having two non-tandem wheels designed to transport a single person by
means of an electric propulsion system” with a maximum speed of twenty miles per
hour.49 In other words, an EPAMD was a statutory creation that solely described the
Segway PT. The regulations governing EPAMDs generally exempted them from
licensure and registration requirements, with some states going so far as to grant
EPAMD operators the same status as pedestrians.50 New Mexico’s statute was
particularly kind to these devices as it included language implying that Segway PTs
and their operators were exempt from all other provisions of the state’s Motor
Vehicle Code.51
The regulatory landscape seemed clear for a transit revolution led by
Segway riders across the country. The revolution, however, never came. The Segway
PT was expensive, heavy, and awkward; cities and the people who lived in them
were reluctant to embrace the device.52 In an instance emblematic of the company’s
misfortune, President George W. Bush was photographed falling off a Segway while
on vacation in Maine.53 President Bush, unlike the company, was unharmed.54 As
sales expectations failed to materialize, Segway struggled to actualize its vision.55
The Segway PT faded into obscurity, relegated to the mundane world of guided tours
and security patrols.56 The statutes regulating EPAMDs remained on the books, legal
reminders of a failed experiment in human transportation.
45. Id.
46. See Matt MacFarland, Segway Was Supposed to Change the World. Two Decades Later, It Just
Might, CNN BUSINESS, (1:04 PM, Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/30/tech/segwayhistory/index.html [https://perma.cc/F9LT-VMB6].
47. See Jim VandeHei, Lobbying to Put the Segway on the Profit Path, THE WASHINGTON POST (Feb.
24, 2003), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/02/24/lobbying-to-put-the-segwayon-profit-path/6a87b91b-e3b3-45eb-8c80-3b4347d55710 [https://perma.cc/YL4Z-UX2L].
48. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-289h (2002) (defining electric personal assistive mobility
devices); MINN. STAT. § 169.212 (2002) (also defining electric personal assistive mobility devices); 2002
N.M. Laws, Ch. 38, §1 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-3-1102) (defining and setting baseline
regulations for electric personal assistive mobility devices); OR. REV. STAT. § 814.550 (2003).
49. See id.; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-4.5(A) (2007).
50. See, e.g., 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1005.1 (2003); MINN. STAT. § 169.212; N.M. STAT. ANN. §
66-3-1102.
51. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-3-1102(D) (2007) (“Except as provided in this section, no other provisions
of the New Mexico Motor Vehicle Code shall apply to electric personal assistive mobility devices.”).
52. See Golson, supra note 44.
53. Bush Fails the Segway Test, BBC NEWS (11:40 AM, June 14, 2003),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2989000.stm [https://perma.cc/DU9Z-24X7].
54. Id.
55. See MacFarland, supra note 46.
56. Golson, supra note 44.
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II. Jurisdictional Applications of DUI Statutes to Non-Automobile Devices.
Even before the Segway tried and failed to dominate urban transportation,
courts grappled with the application of DUI statutes to non-automobile devices. This
section discusses national trends in how state and federal courts have applied DUI
statutes to such devices, extending beyond State v. Richardson57 and State v.
Harrison.58 Courts are inclined to extend the scope of DUI statutes to include nonautomobile devices, although this is not a uniform rule. As devices stray from the
traditional notion of a vehicle as a car or truck, judicial uniformity varies.
A.

Farm Tractors.

Recalling State v. Richardson, the New Mexico Court of Appeals has held
that farm tractors are vehicles in the context of DUI.59 The court noted that the New
Mexico Motor Vehicle Code defined farm tractors as “every motor vehicle designed
and used primarily as a farm implement for drawing plows, mowing machines, and
other implements of husbandry.”60 The court further reasoned that the DUI statute
was not limited to vehicles with a specific function but rather included all vehicles.61
The court held that farm tractors were vehicles for the purposes of the DUI statute
because the statute’s policy goals were served by defining tractors as vehicles.
Appellate courts in several other states have utilized similar reasoning in
determining that farm tractors are vehicles for the purpose of DUI statutes.62 Further,
some of those courts have held that tractors are motor vehicles in the context of DUI,
even when tractors are exempted from motor vehicle regulations by other statutory
provisions.63 This judicial reasoning is in line with the underlying policy of DUI
statutes; farm tractors are large vehicles that can become serious threats to public
safety when their operators are intoxicated.
B.

Utility Type Vehicles.

A utility type vehicle (“UTV”) is a four-wheeled vehicle akin to a golf cart
that is designed to handle off-road terrain.64 In State v. Trusdall, an Idaho court
considered whether an intoxicated UTV operator could be convicted under the state’s
DUI statute.65 There, Trusdall was arrested and charged after police found her doing
donuts in a church parking lot in her Polaris Ranger, a type of UTV.66 Trusdall had
a half-empty beer in the vehicle and was accompanied by six unhelmeted children.67

57. 1992-NMCA-041, 113 N.M. 740, 832 P.2d 801.
58. 1992-NMCA-139, 115 N.M. 73, 846 P.2d 1082.
59. See Richardson, 1992-NMCA-041, ¶ 14,832 P.2d at 804.
60. Id. ¶ 3, 832 P.2d at 802 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102(A)) (original emphasis retained).
61. Id. ¶ 10, 832 P.2d at 803.
62. See, e.g., State v. Laker, 939 N.E.2d 1111, 1114 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); Nemeth v. Commonwealth,
944 S.W.2d 871, 872 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997); City of Wauseon v. Badenhop, 459 N.E.2d 867, 870 (Ohio
1984); State v. Sohn, 535 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
63. See Laker, 939 N.E.2d at 1114; see also Sohn, 193 N.W.2d at 5.
64. See IDAHO CODE § 67-7101(17) (2019).
65. See 155 Idaho 965, 968 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014).
66. Id. at 967–68.
67. Id. at 968.
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The district court dismissed Trusdall’s charges, reasoning that the UTV was not a
motor vehicle for the purposes of Idaho’s general DUI statute; further, Idaho had a
UTV-specific DUI statute which precluded prosecution under the general statute.68
The appellate court reversed.69 The court held that a UTV was a motor
vehicle for the purposes of the general DUI statute.70 The court relied on Idaho’s
statutory definition of a vehicle as “[a] device in, upon, or by which any person or
property may be transported or drawn upon a highway . . . “71 in conjunction the
state’s definition of motor vehicles which included motorized devices.72 Construing
these definitions in light of the state’s DUI statute, the court reasoned that UTVs fit
the definitions of vehicles and motor vehicles because UTVs are motorized and can
transport people on a highway.73
Trusdall demonstrates how prohibition of intoxicated operation of UTVs—
devices with distinct similarities to automobiles—serves the policy goals of DUI
statutes and allows for statutory construction that defines UTVs as motor vehicles.
C.

Mopeds.

Mopeds provide an excellent example of how courts have attempted to
reconcile state DUI statutes with alternative, non-automobile transportation devices.
A moped is commonly defined as “a lightweight, low-powered motor bike that can
be pedaled.”74 In other words, mopeds are hybrid devices propelled by human or
motor power. Mopeds are unique in that they do not fit the general mold of an
automobile or motorcycle but are allowed on public roads. Mopeds are subject to
licensure requirements and operational restrictions in some jurisdictions.75 Thus,
mopeds straddle the line between vehicle and non-vehicle transportation device.
Courts tend to classify mopeds as motor vehicles for the purposes of DUI,
although this trend is not completely uniform. In Adams v. Commonwealth, a
Kentucky court affirmed a DUI conviction for a moped rider. The court reasoned
that a moped was a motor vehicle under the state’s DUI statute because a moped is
a means of transporting a person and is self-propelled.76 The court further noted that
several other states consider mopeds to be vehicles in the DUI context even though
those states exempt mopeds from other regulatory provisions.77 The Kentucky

68. Id.
69. Id. at 972.
70. Trusdall, 155 Idaho at 968 (citing IDAHO CODE § 18-8004).
71. Id. at n.2.
72. Id. at 969 (citing IDAHO CODE § 49-123(2)(g)).
73. Id. at 970.
74. Moped,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/moped
[https://perma.cc/2FRM-XQT5].
75. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 4198M; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-3-1101 (1981); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-140.4 (2016).
76. See Adams v. Commonwealth, 275 S.W.3d 209, 210 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).
77. Id. (citing State v. Saiz, 2001-NMCA-035, ¶ 6, 130 N.M. 333, 24 P.3d 365, 367; State v.
Singleton, 460 S.E.2d 573, 575 (S.C. 1995)).
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court’s reasoning reflects the majority approach taken by courts in applying DUI
statutes to mopeds.78
One court has disagreed with the majority approach to mopeds. Interpreting
Washington state law, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a DUI conviction
where the defendant was operating a moped.79 In a familiar exercise of statutory
construction, the court interpreted Washington’s statutory definition of vehicle in
concert with the state’s moped regulations and DUI statutes.80 The court examined
the history of the moped, noting that a rise in moped popularity corresponded with
legislative efforts to classify and regulate the devices.81 The court noted that the
Washington legislature did not classify mopeds as vehicles, in contrast to other
devices that were explicitly included in the statutory definition.82 Moreover, in
subsequent amendments to the state’s moped regulations, “[the legislature] did not
choose to bring moped within the full definition of motor vehicles, as it did with
bicycles, when it amended the [statutory definition of vehicle].”83 The court reasoned
that the legislature did not demonstrate clear intent that mopeds should be covered
by the state’s DUI statute, exempting mopeds from the strictures of the statute.84
D.

Electric Personal Assistive Mobility Devices.

As discussed above, the electric personal assistive mobility device
(EPAMD) is a statutory definition created in response to the Segway PT. In State v.
Greenman, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed a district court’s dismissal of
DUI charges against a man arrested for riding a Segway PT while intoxicated.85 The
court analyzed Minnesota’s EPAMD regulatory statute to determine how it
interacted with the DUI statute. First, the court reasoned that a Segway PT fit the
definition of an EPAMD because the Segway PT was a “two-wheeled, selfbalancing, battery powered device designed for use in places a car or bicycle cannot
go.”86 The defendant’s Segway was excluded from the provisions of the state’s motor
vehicle regulations because the definition of motor vehicle specifically excluded
EPAMDs.87 The court noted that EPAMD operators were granted the “rights and
responsibilities of a pedestrian” by other traffic regulations and that EPAMDs were
required to operate on sidewalks and in bike paths.88 The court held that a Segway
was not a vehicle in the context of DUI because vehicles were defined as devices

78. See Gregory J. Swain, Annotation, Operation of Mopeds and Motorized Recreational Two-,
Three-, and Four-Wheeled Vehicles as Within Scope of Driving While Intoxicated Statutes, 32 A.L.R. 5th
659, §§ 3[a], 3[b] (2019).
79. United States v. Dotson, 34 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 1994).
80. See id. at 883–85.
81. See id. at 885.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 886.
84. See id.
85. 825 N.W.2d 387, 389 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013).
86. Id. at 391.
87. See id. (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.011).
88. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.212).
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that transported people along highways; by confining EPAMDs to sidewalks and
bike paths, the legislature demonstrated its intent that EPAMDs were not vehicles.89
The Minnesota court’s holding in Greenman may be the only such holding
in the United States. A broad survey of American case law and legal encyclopedias
reveals no analogous decisions. However, Greenman shows that courts will not
automatically extend the provisions of DUI statutes to non-automobile transportation
devices with unclear regulatory status.
E.

Electric Scooters.

Much like EPAMDs, precedent surrounding electric scooters is scant.
However, in 2005, Kevin Crowe was arrested in Hyde County, North Carolina, after
he and a companion were seen operating “stand up scooters” in a disorderly
fashion.90 The court described the scooters as “skateboard[s] with handlebars on the
front” with two wheels arranged in a tandem fashion driven by an electric motor.91
In other words, the defendant was operating an early version of the modern dockless
electric scooter. The defendant was charged and convicted under North Carolina’s
DUI statute and sentenced to a year of probation.92
On appeal, the court interpreted North Carolina’s definition of vehicle to
include the defendant’s “stand up scooter.”93 The court reasoned that the scooter was
a device which drew the defendant along a highway, fitting the statutory definition
of vehicle.94 Further, the court noted that the scooter did not fit the listed exceptions
to that definition. First, the statute provided an exemption for devices used to enhance
mobility. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the scooter served this
function, stating that the defendant was a healthy 25-year-old man who required no
mobility enhancement.95 Second, and more relevant for the purpose of this comment,
the statute excluded EPAMDs from the definition of “vehicle.”96 The defendant
argued that his scooter fell under the North Carolina definition of an EPAMD (which
was functionally equivalent to New Mexico and Minnesota EPAMD definitions).97
The court also rejected this argument, holding that the scooter was not an EPAMD
because it was not self-balancing and its wheels were arranged in a tandem fashion.98
Thus, the “standing scooter” fit neither exception to the definition of “vehicle” and
was subject to the provisions of North Carolina’s DUI statute.99
Notably, the court also discussed the underlying policy of North Carolina’s
statute and commented on the legislature’s responsibility in this realm. The court
noted that the defendant’s conduct could have subjected himself, other pedestrians,

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 392.
See State v. Crowe, 623 S.E.2d 68, 69 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 70–71.
Id. at 71 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-4.01(49)).
Crowe, 623 S.E.2d at 71.
Id.
See id. at 72.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 72.
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and drivers to a “high degree of danger.”100 This created a situation that the
prohibition on DUI was expressly designed to prevent.101 The court further opined
that it believed “the decision as to whether to exclude scooters [from the definition
of vehicle] is best left in the hands of the General Assembly.”102 Crowe is an explicit
example of how legislatures can and should solve the problem of applying DUI
statutes to non-traditional transportation devices.
ANALYSIS & PROPOSAL
III. Applying Current DUI Penalties to Electric Scooters is Ineffective and
Disproportionate.
The policy aims of New Mexico’s DUI statute,103 as established in
numerous appellate decisions, are to protect the public from the hazard of intoxicated
drivers and to protect individuals from harming themselves while driving drunk.104
This policy is executed by imposing criminal penalties on drivers convicted under
the statute.105 A first-time conviction under Section 66-8-102 can yield significant
punishment; possibilities include 90-days of imprisonment, a $500 fine, one year of
probation, community service, and attendance of drug or alcohol rehabilitation
programs.106 Further, a first time DUI conviction requires defendants to obtain an
ignition interlock device at their own cost107 and may result in driver’s license
revocation for one year.108 These penalties understandably escalate for aggravating
circumstances and subsequent convictions.109
The deterrent effect of Section 66-8-102 seems to be working, at least in
part; in 2018, 38 fewer people died on New Mexico roads in alcohol-related crashes
than in 2017.110 These circumstances, however, raise a question: would road deaths
and injuries be significantly decreased by imposing the same harsh penalties on
electric scooter operators?
The answer to this question is beyond the scope of this comment as it would
involve significant amounts of data collection and analysis on the transportation
habits of large populations. However, a facial legal analysis demonstrates the
disproportionality in applying current DUI laws to electric scooters and other microtransit devices. The degree of risk posed by a certain course of conduct is inherently

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102 (2016).
104. See generally State v. Johnson, 2001-NMSC-001, 130 N.M. 6, 15 P.3d 1233; State v. Richardson,
1992-NMCA-041, 113 N.M. 740, 832 P.2d 801; State v. Harrison, 1992-NMCA-139, 115 N.M. 73, 846
P.2d 1082.
105. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102(E)-(T) (2016).
106. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102(E) (2016).
107. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102(O) (2016).
108. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-29(C) (2007).
109. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102 (2016).
110. ASSOCIATED PRESS, DWI Traffic Deaths Down in New Mexico for 2018, ALBUQUERQUE
JOURNAL (Jan. 11, 2019, 8:26 AM), https://www.abqjournal.com/1267121/dwi-traffic-deaths-down-innew-mexico-for-2018.html [https://perma.cc/HRW7-TGLA].
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tied to the severity of the criminal punishment. Indeed, a fundamental principle of
American law holds that punishment must be proportionate to the crime.111
In the case of electric scooters, the punishment imposed by Section 66-8102 is disproportionate to the act of operating a scooter while intoxicated for two
main reasons. First, the license revocation and ignition interlock penalties do nothing
to deter the use of electric scooters. The New Mexico Motor Vehicle Code does not
define electric scooters, much less require a driver’s license for their operation.
License revocation does nothing to legally prevent convicted defendants from
operating scooters. The same rationale applies to the interlock requirement:
interlocks are not applicable to electric scooters and do nothing to prevent people
from drinking and operating scooters. These penalties do not prevent people from
operating scooters while intoxicated in the post-conviction setting, showing that the
interlock and license revocation penalties are not logically tied to preventing
intoxicated scooter operation.
In order to illustrate the second reason for Section 66-8-102’s
disproportionality, consider a hypothetical. Imagine that a young woman was
charged with DUI after scooting around a large urban center after a night out. She
was convicted and subjected to the full range of penalties imposed by Section 66-8102. The purpose of this conviction would be, ostensibly, to deter the young woman
and others like her from operating scooters while intoxicated. This may serve the
compelling public safety rationales underlying a strict liability crime like driving
under the influence. However, the criminal and administrative penalties imposed by
a conviction under Section 66-8-102 are disproportionate to the risks created by
electric scooter operators. These risks pale in comparison to the those posed by the
larger, faster devices and automobiles contemplated by the statute.
Consider the differences between the size and speed of electric scooters and
other devices subject to DUI statutes. A review of commercially available dockless
electric scooters shows that these devices are small, light, and limited to low speeds.
They tend to weigh between thirty and forty pounds and are have maximum speeds
between fifteen and twenty miles per hour.112 In contrast, even small automobiles
routinely weigh in excess of 2,000 pounds and can reach highway speeds in short
order. The Honda Fit, for example, is one of the smallest commercially available
cars113 yet weighs nearly 2,500 pounds and can reach 84 miles per hour in 16
seconds.114 Had the young woman above chosen to drive a 2,000 pound car instead
of a small electric scooter, her risk of injuring others or destroying property would
have been exponentially greater.

111. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 2.14(f) (3d ed. 2000).
112. See, e.g., Ninebot Kickscooter by Segway ES4, SEGWAY, https://store.segway.com/segwayninebot-kickscooter-es4 [https://perma.cc/UPG8-62HS]; INOKIM QUICK 3-Super Electric Scooter,
INOKIMUSA, https://inokimusa.com/models/quick-3-super/#quick [https://perma.cc/JHR7-GBM4];
Hiboy MAX Electric Scooter, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/dp/B07V8H6LPX (last visited Oct. 23,
2019).
113. See Joel Patel, 15 Smallest Cars on the Market, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (July 9, 2019),
https://cars.usnews.com/cars-trucks/smallest-cars-on-the-market.
114. Michael Cantu, 2018 Honda Fit Sport First Test Review: Where Practicality and Fun Meet,
MOTORTREND (May 2, 2018), https://www.motortrend.com/cars/honda/fit/2018/2018-honda-fit-sportfirst-test-review [https://perma.cc/NTE5-W5EC].
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The size and weight imbalances between electric scooters and other devices
illustrate the disproportionate nature of imposing DUI penalties on scooter operators.
In State v. Richardson,115 DUI statutes logically extended to large vehicles such as
farm tractors. The size and weight of farm tractors create obvious hazards to their
own operators and other road users; even a small tractor can weigh 1,500 pounds.116
Similarly, utility type vehicles also share significant physical characteristics with
automobiles. A typical UTV is the Polaris Ranger, which was the vehicle operated
by the defendant in State v. Trusdall.117 A Polaris Ranger weighs approximately
1,400 pounds and has a top speed of 62 miles per hour.118 While mopeds are smaller
vehicles, they have a statutorily mandated top speed of 30 miles per hour119—nearly
double the top speed of most dockless electric scooters. The risk of injury or death
in vehicle collisions greatly increases for vehicles travelling faster than 20 miles per
hour, demonstrating the increased risk posed by mopeds and other high-speed
devices.120
In contrast with each of these devices, electric scooters are physically
incapable of inflicting the same level of harm because of their small size and slow
speeds. Imposing DUI penalties intended for far more dangerous vehicles on electric
scooter operators demonstrates the penalties’ disproportionality.
A more analogous device to electric scooters is the Segway PT. The current
iteration of Segway’s original personal transporter is the Segway PT i2 SE.121 The
device weighs approximately 105 pounds, including its batteries,122 and has a top
speed of 12.5 miles per hour with a maximum rider weight of 260 pounds.123 While
the Segway PT is over twice the weight of most dockless electric scooters, the PT’s
top speed is considerably lower: 12.5 miles per hour is a brisk run, while 18 or 20
miles per hour exceeds the physical limits of most human beings. The Minnesota
Court of Appeals decision in State v. Greenman124 is borne out by these figures: the
policy concerns underlying DUI statutes address public safety, and a slow-moving,
relatively light-weight device poses much less risk to the public than other large,
high-speed vehicles. The penalties for operating electric scooters while intoxicated

115. 1992-NMCA-041, 113 N.M. 740, 832 P.2d 801.
116. See Compact Tractor Spec Guide, COMPACT EQUIPMENT (June 13, 2013),
https://compactequip.com/tractors/compact-tractor-spec-guide [https://perma.cc/5YYD-9R46].
117. 155 Idaho 965, 967 (Ct. App. 2014).
118. UTV Shootout: Kawasaki Mule PRO-FXT vs. Polaris Ranger CP 900, DIRTWHEELS MAGAZINE
(July 24, 2015), https://dirtwheelsmag.com/utv-shootout-kawasaki-mule-pro-fxt-vs-polaris-ranger-xp900 [https://perma.cc/LS53-DSC5].
119. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-3-1101(D) (1981).
120. Cf. Lena Groeger, Unsafe at Many Speeds, PROPUBLICA (May 25, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/unsafe-at-many-speeds [https://perma.cc/CF84-KSKW] (detailing
studies establishing that risk of injury and death for pedestrians increases greatly as vehicle speeds rise
above 20 miles per hour).
121. See SEGWAY, INC., USER MANUAL: SEGWAY PERSONAL TRANSPORTER (2019),
https://www.segway.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/24010-00001_ab_pr_se_user_manual.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8265-TJ8N].
122. Id. at 13, 86.
123. Id. at 12.
124. 825 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013).
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should be proportional to the lower risk of harm.125 Current statutory penalties for
DUI are not proportional to the risk of harm posed by intoxicated scooter operators
and do not act as effective deterrents.
IV. A New and Necessary Remedy.
A.

The Need.

New Mexico’s driving under the influence statute was written and enacted
in 1953, decades before the rise of dockless electric scooters and other alternative
forms of urban transport.126 The statute has been amended twenty-five times since
its initial passage; no single amendment considers alternative forms of transit, instead
retaining the broad prohibition on the operation of vehicles while intoxicated.127
Further, the statutory definition of vehicle was not created until 1990 and has not
been amended since 2005.128 In 2001, State v. Saiz provided a judicial interpretation
of the term “vehicle” in the context of DUI in New Mexico.129 The legislature then
established the state’s electric personal assistive mobility device statute in 2002,
quickly creating ambiguity between the holding in Saiz and the updated Motor
Vehicle Code.130
New Mexico law regulating driving under the influence as applied to nonautomobile devices requires an update. The emergence of dockless electric scooters
in cities like Albuquerque131 and Las Cruces132 has created a need for clarification
regarding the status of these devices in relation to the state’s DUI statute. As early
as six days after dockless electric scooters were distributed in Albuquerque, a woman
was arrested and charged with DUI after operating a scooter while intoxicated.133
The DUI charges were dismissed in that case after the defendant pled to a lesser
charge,134 but the incident demonstrates the need for legal clarification. The likely
reoccurrence of such conduct underscores the need for action. Doing nothing here,
or simply exempting scooter operators from criminal liability under the state DUI

125. Cf. LAFAVE, supra note 111, at §2.14(f).
126. See 1953 N.M. Laws 357-58.
127. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102 (2019).
128. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-4.19 (2019).
129. 2001-NMCA-035, ¶ 4, 130 N.M. 333, 24 P.3d 365, 366.
130. See 2002 N.M. Laws 231-32.
131. Jessica Dyer, Rental E-Scooters Are Hitting Albuquerque Streets, ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL (May
24, 2019, 1:53 PM), https://www.abqjournal.com/1320035/e-scooters-hit-albuquerque-streets.html
[https://perma.cc/WP4T-DVGL].
132. Portia Baudisch, NMSU Brings Electric Scooters to Campus, CBS4 LAS CRUCES (Jan. 18, 2019),
https://cbs4local.com/news/local/nmsu-brings-electric-scooters-to-campus
[https://perma.cc/HD9YLPSJ].
133. See Matthew Reisen, Woman Riding on Electric Scooter Charged with DWI, ALBUQUERQUE
JOURNAL (May 30 2019, 11:39 PM), https://www.abqjournal.com/1322102/woman-on-electric-scootercharged-with-dwi.html [https://perma.cc/SE5M-7GYT].
134. See Jeannie Nguyen, Albuquerque Woman Caught Driving Drunk on E-Scooter Dodges DWI
Conviction, KRQE.COM (Sept. 23, 2019, 5:30 PM), https://www.krqe.com/news/albuquerquemetro/albuquerque-woman-caught-driving-drunk-on-e-scooter-dodges-dwi-conviction
[https://perma.cc/3QJE-49RT].
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statute, would fail to deter conduct that could put the public at risk. Dockless electric
scooters require a more thoughtful regulatory approach.
B.

The Proposal.

The proper venue in which to address this problem is the legislature. The
New Mexico legislature should formulate a statutory scheme that accounts for the
risks posed by intoxicated scooter operators while adhering to principles of
proportionality. The proposal is two-fold: first, the legislature should define dockless
electric scooters and other micro-transit devices; second, the legislature should create
a new class of criminal penalty directed at preventing intoxicated scooter operation.
The Appendix attached to this comment contains model statutes for both provisions.
Using this comment’s model definition as a guide, the legislature should
craft a flexible statutory definition that includes dockless electric scooters while
allowing for the emergence of similar devices. A flexible definition accounts for
future devices; one of the pitfalls of New Mexico’s EPAMD definition is that it is
narrowly tailored to only include the Segway PT device.135 The rapid emergence of
dockless electric scooters demonstrates how modern transit solutions are unlikely to
fit into existing statutory molds. Lawmakers can avoid this legal uncertainty by
allowing for some flexibility in the definition of electric scooters and other
lightweight, low-speed devices. For the purposes of the statutory definition, these
devices would be termed “micro-transit devices” in order to preclude a narrow
application of the definition to electric scooters alone. New Mexico’s statutory
definition of EPAMDs provides a template of sorts; simple modifications removing
the non-tandem wheel requirement and imposing a weight restriction would create a
flexible statute covering electric scooters and similar micro-transit devices. Crafting
a new definition entirely from scratch is simply unnecessary.
Once dockless electric scooters have a statutory definition, the legislature
could turn to creating a proportional criminal penalty that effectively deters
intoxicated scooter operation. Like the definition portion, legislators need not
reinvent the wheel. Section 66-8-102 provides statutory language that could be
modified to create a criminal penalty more in-line with the risks posed by intoxicated
scooter operators. A new micro-transit device statute could retain Section 66-8-102’s
core prohibitory substance136 while changing the phrases “to drive a vehicle” and
135. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-4.5(A) (2007).
136. The substantive portion of the Section 66-8-102 reads as follows:
A. It is unlawful for a person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to drive
a vehicle within this state.
B. It is unlawful for a person who is under the influence of any drug to a degree that
renders the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle to drive a vehicle within this
state.
C. It is unlawful for:
(1) a person to drive a vehicle in this state if the person has an alcohol concentration of
eight one hundredths or more in the person’s blood or breath within three hours of
driving the vehicle and the alcohol concentration results from alcohol consumed before
or while driving the vehicle; or
(2) a person to drive a commercial motor vehicle in this state if the person has an alcohol
concentration of four one hundredths or more in the person’s blood or breath within
three hours of driving the commercial motor vehicle and the alcohol concentration
results from alcohol consumed before or while driving the vehicle.
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“safely driving a vehicle” to “to operate a micro-transit device” and “safely operating
a micro-transit device” (these changes are present in the Appendix’s model statute).
The legislature could also retain a modified version of the language creating
aggravating circumstances for the crime, particularly those circumstances that
involve infliction of bodily harm. These actions would create a new class of crime
called operating a micro-transit device while intoxicated.
After the core prohibition, the new criminal statute would substantially
depart from the language of Section 66-8-102. The model statute shown in the
Appendix serves as a basic outline. The penalties imposed by the new statute should
be proportional to the potential harm. The easiest penalties to eliminate would be the
ignition interlock137 and mandatory license revocation138 penalties that accompany
DUI convictions. These penalties are disproportionate and do nothing to prevent
people from operating scooters while intoxicated. The legislature would also need to
consider penalties involving fines, jail time, or probation. It seems intuitive that
proportional penalties would involve lower fines and less jail or probation time given
the lower risk posed by intoxicated scooter operators. The exact figures here would
be subject to debate and legislative review. Ideally, the legislature would be able to
determine the appropriate category in which the new crime would fall. Since
penalties correlate with the severity of a crime,139 operating an electric scooter while
intoxicated should be a petty misdemeanor as defined in the New Mexico Criminal
Code.140 The statute should allow for elevation of the crime to misdemeanor or felony
status to account for aggravating circumstances such as the infliction of bodily harm
or prior convictions. These measures would create proportional criminal penalties
for operating a scooter while intoxicated. Moreover, these measures would protect
public safety by deterring the hazardous conduct of intoxicated scooter operation.141
C.

The Proposal’s Feasibility.

A new statutory framework would be feasible and relatively
uncontroversial. Dockless electric scooters may be the subject of strong and
discordant personal opinions,142 but current legislative efforts around electric
scooters have enjoyed bipartisan support. In 2019, bipartisan legislation setting

137. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102(O) (2016).
138. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-29 (C) (2007).
139. Cf. Seven Rivers Farm, Inc. v. Reynold, 1973-NMSC-039, ¶¶ 33–35, 508 P.2d 1276, 1281 (citing
Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966)).
140. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-6 (1963).
141. It is worth noting that electric scooters riders may benefit from other regulatory provisions,
including licensure and helmet requirements. However, these considerations extend beyond the sphere of
pure criminal liability and the boundaries of this comment. Scooter licensure, along with broader
regulatory measures for micro-transit devices, deserve consideration at another time.
142. Compare John Burgoyne, The Case for Electric Scooters, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 5,
2019, 8:30 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/cities/articles/2019-09-05/commentary-the-case-forelectric-scooters with Laura Newberry, Must Reads: Fed-up Locals Are Setting Electric Scooters on Fire
and
Burying
Them
at
Sea,
L.A.
TIMES
(Aug.
10,
2018,
4:00
AM),
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-bird-scooter-vandalism-20180809-story.html
[https://perma.cc/8FYV-WAG4].
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baseline regulatory provisions passed into law in Florida,143 New Jersey,144
Tennessee,145 and Wisconsin.146 Electric scooter regulatory bills have also been
introduced in other states and continue to move through the legislative process.147
The bipartisan nature of these bills shows that legislators have recognized a need for
solutions to the problems posed by electric scooters and are willing to formulate
solutions.
No current legislative effort answers the question of whether DUI statutes
will apply to dockless electric scooters. If New Mexico was to pass such a bill, it
would serve as a national example in determining the potential criminal liability of
electric scooter riders. Legislators in New Mexico and across the country have
clearly recognized that dockless electric scooters will require new regulatory
frameworks. Prompt legislative action will make New Mexico one of the first states
to develop a body of law addressing DUI as applied to the burgeoning micro-transit
industry.
V.

Legislative Action is Preferable to a Judicial Approach.

Application of current DUI penalties to dockless electric scooter operators
is disproportionate and illogical. Without legislative action, the judiciary will be left
to sort out how scooters and other micro-transit devices fit into existing statutory
frameworks. As discussed in the background section of this comment, the litany of
cases subjecting or exempting other non-automobile devices to DUI statutes has
centered around statutory construction and judicial interpretation of terms like
“vehicle” and “motor vehicle.” In those cases, courts were able to interpret DUI
statutes, statutory definitions of various devices, and basic regulations of those
devices in pari materia. New Mexico courts have utilized a similar analytic
framework. In State v. Saiz, the court was able to draw on the state’s DUI statute, the
statutory definitions of “vehicle” and “moped,” and the regulatory statute for mopeds
in order to determine whether moped operators were subject to DUI penalties.148
However, no statutory definition for dockless electric scooters exists in New Mexico
law, nor is there any baseline regulatory statute for these devices.
The only statutory provisions that could conceivably cover dockless electric
scooters are the definition149 and regulatory statute150 for electric personal assistive
mobility devices. Even these statutes do not explicitly define electric scooters and
have some key differences. For example, the definition of an EPAMD mandates the
device have two non-tandem wheels,151 while electric scooters have wheels arranged

143. See H.B. 453, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2019).
144. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:1-1 (2019); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-14.1.
145. S.B. 1107, 111th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2019).
146. S.B. 152, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2019).
147. E.g., Assemb. B. 1286, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019); H.B. 282, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M.
2019); S.B. S05294A, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
148. See 2001-NMCA-035, ¶¶ 6–8, 130 N.M. 333, 24 P.3d 365.
149. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-4.5(A) (2007).
150. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-3-1102 (2007).
151. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-4.5(A).
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in a tandem fashion. While EPAMDs have been judicially152 and statutorily153
exempted from other motor vehicle regulations, the statutes regulating EPAMDs are
an inexact fit for dockless electric scooters and other micro-transit devices. This
creates a situation where the judiciary would have to fit a scooter-shaped problem
into a Segway-shaped box; the solution is just as inelegant as the visual.
Further, a judicial definition confining electric scooters within the New
Mexico Motor Vehicle Code could result in a full application of the DUI statute to
electric scooters. As of this writing, the broad holding in State v. Saiz has not been
overruled and remains the controlling authority interpreting the term “vehicle.”154
Principles of stare decisis create high barriers for reversing this precedent. New
Mexico courts consider four factors prior to overruling precedent: (1) whether a
precedent is unworkable; (2) the reliance on precedent; (3) the development of new
legal principles; and (4) whether factual circumstances have changed in the
intervening period so as to “[rob] the old rule” of its justification.155 While the broad
definition of “vehicle” articulated in Saiz arose before the advent of dockless electric
scooters, the central holding of the case is not so unworkable to warrant overruling
it. Defining electric scooters as vehicles within the purview of the state’s DUI statute
creates disproportionate penalties, but is not so absurd so as to be considered legally
unworkable. Moreover, no new legal principles have emerged regarding electric
scooters; rather, the issue here is a distinct lack of scooter-specific law. Finally, while
the emergence of electric scooters in New Mexico cities represents a change in
factual circumstances, that change does not indicate that the urban transit landscape
is fundamentally different from the circumstances in Saiz. Dockless electric scooters
do not rob the court’s interpretation of the term “vehicle” of its underlying
justification.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals decision in State v. Crowe156 is
instructive. There, the court was called to determine the applicability of the North
Carolina DUI statute to an early form of the dockless electric scooter.157 The court
held that electric scooters were vehicles under the statutory definition of the term and
were not covered by the statutory exemption of EPAMDs from other code
provisions.158 Thus, electric scooters were covered by the state’s DUI statute.159 The
court reasoned that defining the criminal liability of scooter operators was the
express responsibility of the legislature, stating:
Here, in a situation in which the legislature has allowed a limited
number of very specific exceptions to a statute, it would be
inappropriate for this Court to create another. The legislature may
choose to make an exception for electric scooters such as the one

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See State v. Greenman, 825 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-3-1102(D).
See 2001-NMCA-035, 130 N.M. 333, 24 P.3d 365.
Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, ¶ 34, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305, 315.
623 S.E.2d 68 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
See id. at 70.
Id. at 72–73.
Id. at 73.
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in this case. Until that time, we apply the statutory scheme as it has
been enacted.160
Ultimately, courts are responsible for interpreting statutory provisions,
while the legislature is responsible for creating new ones. As the court noted in
Crowe, this notion applies to electric scooters. The legislative proposal detailed in
Part IV would be preferable to a slow and inefficient slog through the courts.
CONCLUSION
Dockless electric scooters are likely to become staples of modern life by
providing an accessible, convenient, and inexpensive means of urban
transportation.161 As they become more commonplace, the issue of intoxicated
scooter operators will continue to frustrate judges and advocates working in the
criminal justice system. Applying current regulatory frameworks to dockless electric
scooters is disproportionate and does little to actually deter drunk electric scooter
riders from taking to the streets. Further, New Mexico courts’ current interpretation
of the term “vehicle” is overly broad and fails to account for the novelty of microtransit devices.
The policy aims underlying the prohibition on DUI would be better served
by a completely new approach. A legislative solution defining electric scooters and
other micro-transit devices allows for the creation of a new class of crime called
operating a micro-transit device under the influence. This new class of crime should
be proportional to the lower risk posed by operators of electric scooters while also
providing sufficient deterrent effect. Such action by the New Mexico legislature will
put the state at the forefront of determining criminal liability in the context of electric
scooters and other micro-transit devices. The proposals and rationales outlined in
this comment are meant to inform that process.

160. Id.
161. See Patrick McGeehan, Riding While Drunk and Other Dangers of the Electric Scooter Craze,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2019, 8:10 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/nyregion/lime-scooterhoboken.html [https://perma.cc/X3J5-2WKN].
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APPENDIX: MODEL STATUTES
Model Statutory Definition of Micro-Transit Devices:
“Micro-transit device” means any self-propelled device weighing not more
than 50 pounds designed to transport a single person at a maximum speed
of 20 miles per hour across a paved level surface when powered solely by
its own propulsion system.
Model Statute for Operating a Micro-Transit Device Under the Influence:
A. It is unlawful for a person who is under the influence of intoxicating
liquor to operate a micro-transit device within this state.
B. It is unlawful for a person who is under the influence of any drug to a
degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a micro-transit
device to operate a micro-transit device within this state.
C. Operating a micro-transit device under the influence of intoxicating
liquor occurs when:
A person operates a micro-transit device within this state, and the person
has an alcohol concentration of eight one hundredths or more in the person’s
blood or breath within three hours of operating the micro-transit device and
the alcohol concentration results from alcohol consumed before or while
driving the device.
D. Aggravated operating a micro-transit device under the influence consists
of:
(1) causing bodily injury to a human being as a result of the unlawful
operation of a micro-transit device while under the influence of intoxicating
liquors or drugs.
(2) causing damage to private or public property, not including the microtransit device itself, as a result of the unlawful operation of a micro-transit
device while under the influence of intoxicating liquors or drugs.
(3) operating a micro-transit device while intoxicated subsequent to a prior
conviction under this Section.
E. A first-time conviction pursuant to subsections A or B is a petty
misdemeanor.
F. A conviction pursuant to subsection D is a misdemeanor or felony
depending on the severity of the aggravating circumstances.
G. A conviction pursuant to this section shall be punishable by
imprisonment and fines of appropriate length and amounts as determined
by the New Mexico Criminal Sentencing Act.

